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The existence of “Hot Hands” and “Streaks” in sports and gambling is hotly debated,
but there is no uncertainty about the recent batting-average of the New York Times: it
is now two-for-two in mangling and misunderstanding elementary concepts in probability
and statistics; and mixing up the key points in a recent paper that re-examines earlier
work on the statistics of streaks. In so doing, it’s high-visibility articles have added to the
general-public’s confusion about probability, making it seem mysterious and paradoxical
when it needn’t be. However, those articles make excellent case studies on how to get
it wrong, and for discussions in high-school and college classes focusing on quantitative
reasoning, data analysis, probability and statistics. What I have written here is intended
for that audience.
1 The Background
The starting point for this discussion is an article by George Johnson in the New York
Times Sunday Review on October 18, 2015, entitled “Gambler, Scientists and Mysterious
Hot Hand”. That article discusses the claims in a recent working paper (not yet peer
reviewed) by two economists, Joshua Miller and Adam Sanjurjo, entitled “Surprised
by the Gambler’s and Hot Hand Fallacies? A Truth in the Law of Small Numbers”
[2]. According to the Johnson article, the Miller and Sanjurjo paper claims that the
authors of a classic 1985 paper (Thomas Gilovich, Robert Vallone and Amos Tversky)
[1] debunking the concept of hot hands in basketball, made an error in how they thought
about probability. Quoting from the Johnson article:
A working paper published this summer has caused a stir by proposing that a
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classic body of research disproving the existence of the hot hand in basketball
is flawed by a subtle misperception about randomness. (italics added)
Then, on October 27, 2015, in a follow-on NYT article (in TheUpshot) entitled
“Streaks Like Daniel Murphey’s Aren’t Necessarily Random”, Binyamin Appelbaum
wrote:
Last year two economists launched a more fundamental assault: They argued
that disproofs of the “hot hand” theory had made a basic statistical error.
(italics added)
Its a challenge to keep the players straight in this story, so to recap, the issue of hot
hands and the probability of streaks was first discussed in two academic papers and then
in two subsequent NYT articles: the first paper, by Gilovich et al. in 1985 (which we will
refer to as “GVT”), claims that the belief in hot-hands (in basketball) is not statistically
supported; the second by Miller and Sanjurjo (which we will refer to as “MS”) in the
summer of 2015 re-examines that work, suggests that statistical errors were made, and
comes to a different conclusion; the third by George Johnson in October 2015 in the
NYT discussing the claims in MS; and a fourth article, by Appelbaum ten days later in
the NYT that repeats, and even strengthens, some of the statement from the Johnson
article.
I am not interested in questions of hot-hands, streaks and gambling per se. Instead,
my interest, and focus here, is how the New York Times articles discus probability and
statistics, and the confused and incorrect statements made in those articles. However, in
order to explain the NYT errors, we will have to discuss streaks, hot hands, and the two
academic papers to some extent.
2 The Central Technical Issues
We want to identify the claimed “subtle misperception about randomness” and “basic
statistical error” in GVT that the two articles in the NYT are talking about. To do that,
we have to say a bit about the statistical approach to the study of streaks and hot hands.
When trying to determine if streaks (successive baskets made, heads on coin flips, wins
in gambling, for example) have non-random causes, such as skill or “being in the zone”,
the statistical approach is to compare numerical features in observed data to features in
data generated at random. For example, suppose that a player makes a basket (a hit,
coded as ‘H’) on 50% of the shots he takes, and that we have the entire record of the
player’s hits and misses. We could look at that data and ask what percentage of the Hs
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are followed by another H. It has little effect in long sequences, but in a short sequence,
we will compute the percentage by counting the number of Hs in all but the last position,
and the number of those Hs that are followed by another H (possibly in the last position).
For clarity, we give that percentage the name HH-percentage, although that term was
not used in the NYT articles, or in the academic papers. We could also determine the
HH-percentage from data on Hs followed by a miss, coded as a ‘T’. See Table 1.
The HH-percentage might not be the ideal way to study questions of streaks and hot
hands, although a player with a few long streaks (who probably would be considered
to have a hot hand) has a larger HH-percentage than a player with more, but shorter,
streaks. Still, the HH-percentage (in different terminology) is one of the first statistics
examined in the GVT paper, where they computed the HH-percentage for several indi-
vidual NBA players in an individual season. And, the HH-percentage is the only statistic
that is discussed in the NYT articles, so it is the focus of this note. But, how specifically
would we use the HH-percentage to determine if the player’s Hs are unusually “streaky”,
i.e., more concentrated into streaks that what we would expect by chance alone? GVT
says “The player’s performance, then, can be compared to a sequence of hits and misses
generated by tossing a coin.”
Specifically, we could generate a long random sequence, where each character in the
sequence is independently chosen to be an H or a T with equal probability; and then
compute the HH-percentage from that long sequence. We call that HH-percentage a
“reference number”, and remember that it is obtained from a sequence that does not
have any non-random influence. Then, we would compare the HH-percentage obtained
from the record of a chosen player to the reference number. Intuitively, when a player’s
actual HH-percentage is computed from a long sequence (i.e., a large amount of data)
it seems appropriate to compare it to this reference number.1 If the reference number is
very close to, or larger than, the HH-percentage in the player’s record, then the player’s
HH-percentage does not support the conclusion that the player’s streaks are due to some
non-random influence. That means, from the perspective of the HH-percentage, the
player’s baskets do not appear to be more streaky than do the Hs in a random sequence.
Conversely, if the player’s HH-percentage is “significantly” larger than the reference value,
we do feel justified in thinking that some non-random influence is at work. How much
larger a player’s HH-percentage must be in order to be “significant”, to support the
assertion of non-randomness, is exactly the kind of issue that is studied in statistics and
probability theory, and is not our main concern here.
1However, if a player’s HH-percentage is computed only from a “relatively short” sequence (say a
single game or even a single season), then the reference number defined above might not be the most
informative one to use. Foreshadowing what will come later in this paper, this will be a key issue.
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Comparing a player’s record to a randomly generated sequence is the basic statistical
approach, but do we actually need to generate a random sequence in order to determine
the reference value? No. We might need to generate random sequences to determine more
complex statistics in random sequences, but in the case of the HH-percentage, we don’t
need to generate any sequences because we know that the probability of an H following an
H is exactly the probability of an H on any individual flip, i.e, one-half. So, the observed
HH-percentage in a long randomly-generated sequence will be about 50%; about equal
to the frequency that an H is followed by a T, or a T is followed by an H. That point
should not be controversial or confusing.
But the NYT article did confuse it
Contrary to the point above, Johnson in the October 17 NYT article states:
For a 50 percent shooter, for example, the odds of making a basket are sup-
posed to be no better after a hit – still 50-50. But in a purely random situa-
tion, according to the new analysis, a hit would be expected to be followed by
another hit less than half the time. (italics added)
To be clear, the NYT article is talking about a “purely random situation” of (mem-
oryless) shots by a 50% shooter, or equivalently, a sequence of fair coin flips. It is not
talking about some basketball-related phenomena (for example, a player being more tired
or more closely guarded after making several shots). And, for even greater clarity, I in-
terpret the statement “ ... in a purely random situation ... a hit would be expected to be
followed by a another hit less than half the time” as the same as “... in a purely random
situation ... the odds of making a basket after a hit are less than 50-50. Equivalently, in
a purely random situation ... the probability that a hit will be followed by another hit is
less than one-half.”2
3 Really!?!
Can that statement about hits (and coin flips) in Johnson’s article be correct, that “in a
purely random situation ... a hit is expected to be followed by another hit less than half
the time?” Surely, there is something wrong here, because in a purely random situation
every flip will be an H with the same probability that it is a T — exactly one-half. So,
2If you think this interpretation is wrong, then you will probably find the rest of this paper wrong,
and can stop reading now.
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a hit is expected to be followed by another hit (H) one-half of the time, which is as often
as it is expected to be followed by a miss (T). Several of the on-line comments to the
NYT submitted by readers after the publication of Johnson’s article correctly pointed
this out, and even identified the source of Johnson’s confusion, which we will discuss
in detail below. But, despite the readers comments, ten days later, Appelbaum in the
NYT article (in TheUpshot), doubled down on Johnson’s statements, making even more
explicit statements:
Flip a coin, and there’s an equal chance it will land heads or tails. Researchers
had treated that 50 percent chance as the definition of a random outcome. But
Joshua Miller of Bocconi University and Adam Sanjurjo of the Universidad de
Alicante pointed out something surprising: In the average series of four coin
flips, the sequence heads-heads is significantly less common than heads-tails.
(italics added)
Really? In the table of coin flips (similar to Table 1 below) that Appelbaum directs
the reader to examine, heads-heads occurs exactly the same number of times that heads-
tails occurs. So is Appelbaum’s statement pure nonsense, or is it based on some truth,
but one that is very poorly stated? He continues:
On average, just 40.5 percent of the heads are followed by another heads.
Yes, this sounds crazy. But it happens to be true.3
And, this assertion has consequences for the study of streaks. Referring to MS,
Appelbaum writes:
The implication, they argued, is that past studies had set the bar too high.
Streaks that has looked like random luck were actually statistically unlikely.
The “hot hands fallacy”, they wrote, was remarkably persistent because it
was true.
3One might argue that Appelbaum has a tiny, tiny bit a wiggle room, because he does not define
what “the average series of four coin flips” means, or what “on average” means in the second quote.
But he directs the reader to the Johnson article with the table showing that exactly 50% of the heads,
in the first three positions, are followed by another head. So, his statement is particularly confused and
incorrect.
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4 So What is Going on?
Both NYT articles imply that the “basic statistical error” made in GVT is to assume
that the probability that an H will follow an H is one-half, in sequences of heads and
tails created by flips of a fair coin. In the case of the sixteen length-four sequences, the
implied “error” in GVT is the assumption that 50% of the heads that are followed by
another flip, are followed by another heads. But they are. So what is going on here?
Spoiler alert: In trying to interpret MS, the Johnson article made incorrect and
imprecise statements about probability and statistics. The Appelbaum article repeated,
more strongly, the main one. Both papers miss the key points made in MS. In truth, in
purely fair coin flips, each H (other than the last one in the sequence) will be followed
by another H with probability one-half. Period. Miller and Sanjurjo also make that clear.
So how did Johnson and Appelbaum get it so wrong?
4.1 The Johnson Table
Following a similar example and table in the MS paper (but not a similar conclusion),
here is what Johnson did in his article. He looked at the sixteen, length-four sequences
shown in Table 1. For each sequence that contains an H in one of the first three positions
(there are fourteen of these) he calculated the percentage of those Hs that are followed by
another H. For example, in the sequence HHTT, the percentage is 50%, and in HHHH it is
100%, and in HTTT it is 0%. Hence, Johnson calculated the individual HH-percentage for
each of the relevant fourteen sequences. Then he added those fourteen HH-percentages,
divided by fourteen, and got about 40.5%. That is, he averaged the HH-percentages
calculated from the fourteen relevant sequences. As he writes:
... calculate for each sequence the odds that a head is followed by a head and
average the results. The answer is not 50-50, as most people would expect,
but 40.5 percent – in favor of tails.
All true. The arithmetic is right, and the 40.5% average may indeed seem surprising
to some people. But so what? What does that average have to do with the probability
that an H is followed by another H? Nothing! It is nonsense to conclude from that
averaging that “a hit is expected to be followed by a hit less than 50% of the time”, or
that “On average, just 40.5 percent of the heads are followed by another heads.”
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4.2 Counting Bathrooms
In order to explain what Johnson and Appelbaum got wrong, we look here at a more
extreme scenario. Suppose we want to calculate the average number of bathrooms in the
houses in the U.S. The right way to calculate this is to find the number of bathrooms in
each of the (millions) of U.S. houses, sum up those numbers and divide by the number of
houses in the U.S. But here is another suggestion: After finding the number of bathrooms
in each of the houses, divide the houses into two groups: those that have more than
30 bathrooms, and those that have 30 or fewer bathrooms. (San Simeon, the former
country house of the Hearst family, has 61 bathrooms, and the White House has 35).
Next, compute the average number of bathrooms in the first group of houses (perhaps
that average is 32.5 bathrooms), and compute the average for the second group of houses
(around 2.7 in a recent survey). Finally, average those two averages, to get 17.5 bathrooms
(just slightly more than I have in my house). And even though I made up the average of
32.5 for the first group, the correct average in the first group will be at least 30 (why?),
and the average in the second group is actually close to 2.7, so the true average of those
averages will be larger than 16. Probably (but what does that really mean?), the average
of 16 bathrooms per U.S. house does not mesh with your sense of reality. So what went
wrong?
By averaging the two averages, we give equal weight to each of the averages, ignoring
the fact that the first average comes from a very small number of houses, while the
second average comes from a huge number of houses. That kind of average is called an
unweighted average. But, to get the correct average number of bathrooms, you must give
equal weight to each house, not to each group of houses.
Now if for some reason you don’t have data on the number of bathrooms in each
individual house, but are given the two averages in the two groups, and are also given
the number of houses in the two groups, you could multiply the first average by the
number of houses in that group, multiply the second average by the number of houses in
that group, and add the two products to get the total number of bathrooms in the U.S.
Then, to get the correct average number of bathrooms, you would divide that total by
the sum of the number of houses in the two groups, i.e., the total number of houses. This
is called a weighted average of the averages, and would give a result of about 2.7. Note
that computing the weighted average is just a backwards way of doing what we would
do to compute the average number of bathrooms in a U.S. house, if we had the raw data
on each house: find the total number of bathrooms and divide by the number of houses.
Back to HH-percentages How does the bathroom story relate to HH-percentages?
There are 24 Hs that occur in the first three positions of the 16 sequences of length four.
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These 24 Hs are analogous to the houses in the bathroom story. If you want to compute
the percentage of those 24 Hs that are followed by an H, or equivalently, how often “a
hit is expected to be followed by a hit”, you should not divide those 24 Hs into groups
(in this case, 14 groups, each called a “sequence”), find the HH-percentage in each group
(sequence), and then average those percentages. To do so gives equal weight to each group
(sequence), ignoring the fact that some groups (sequences) have more Hs than others do.
That is, you should not compute an unweighted average of the HH-percentages. Instead,
to calculate the probability that an H follows an H, you need to give equal weight to
each H that occurs in the first three positions of some sequence, or if you start from the
HH-percentages of the fourteen sequences, you need to compute a weighted average of
those HH-percentages; each HH-percentage weighted by (multiplied by) the number of
Hs in the first three positions of the sequence that the HH-percentage comes from.
Another numerical reflection of the difference between unweighted and weighted av-
erage HH-percentages is the fact that in the sixteen length-four sequences, there are only
eight that have any occurrence of HH, but there are eleven that have an occurrence of
HT. That is, the distribution of HH and HT is not uniform in the fourteen sequences.4
Similarly, there are seven sequences that have HHH, but eight that have HHT. So, in
random sequences, if your unit of analysis is the whole sequence, you will observe a T
following an H more often (in more sequences) than an H following an H. You will also
observe an H following a T in more sequences than an H following an H. So, by equally
weighting the sequences, we under-represent the HHs and over-represent the HTs.
The Take-Home Lesson: The unweighted average of the averages calculated from
non-overlapping subsets of a set is not always equal to the average in the entire set. That
is just a numerical fact, and is elementary text-book material in any basic statistics book
or course. The numerical example in Johnson’s article does nothing more than illustrate
that fact in the case of all possible length-four sequences of fair coin flips. It does not
establish that “In a purely random situation ... a hit would be expected to be followed
by another hit less than half the time.”
4.3 The MS Table and Unweighted Averages
While Johnson and Appelbaum completely miss the issue of weighted versus unweighted
averaging, Miller and Sanjurjo understand it perfectly well, as did many of the NYT
readers who commented on the Johnson and Appelbaum articles. MS contains a table
4At first, this may seem paradoxical since the two counts might be expected to be equal by “symme-
try”. But, the two occurrences are not symmetric, which I leave you to ponder.
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that is similar to the one in Johnson’s article (and to Table 1 below), and it obtains the
same average, but MS does not state the conclusion that Johnson and Appelbaum do.
In fact, in a blog discussion this summer, Miller states:
We do not assert that: “a way to determine the probability of a heads follow-
ing a heads in a fixed sequence, you may calculate the proportion of times a
head is followed by a head for each possible sequence and then compute the
average proportion, giving each sequence an equal weighting” ...
it is a mistaken intuition to treat this computation as an unbiased estimator
of the true probability.
MS begins by stating that if one million fair coins are each flipped four times, and an
HH-percentage5 is obtained for each coin, those million HH-percentages would average
to “approximately 0.4”. In explaining this, they state:
The key ... is that it is not the flip that is treated as the unit of analysis, but
rather the sequence of flips from each coin ... (italics added)
Therefore, in treating the sequence as the unit of analysis, the average em-
pirical probability across coins amounts to an unweighted average6 ...
The unweighted average of averages (about 0.405) is not equal to the probability
(exactly 0.5) of an H following an H in four fair coin flips. The NYT articles printed
nonsense, because what they wrote suggests that these are the same.7
But why? The table in the Johnson article, which the NYT articles misunderstand,
originates in the MS paper. But why? One of the reasons MS examines unweighted
averages is explained next.
5The actual terms they use are “relative frequency” and “empirical probability”.
6For clarity, note that in this quote, it is implied that “sequence of flips” is “sequence of four flips”.
7The Johnson paper is actually more confused and confusing, because, as explained above, it suggests
that the probability that an H follows an H is less than half, and yet it also points out that in the sixteen
sequences of length four, the number of Hs that are followed by another H is exactly the same as the
number of Hs that are followed by a T. It tries to explain this apparent contradiction by introducing the
concept of a “selection bias”. This is actually more nonsense; we will return to this later.
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5 Modeling the Gambler’s Fallacy
The Miller and Surjurjo paper is concerned with several streak phenomena in addition to
hot hands in sports. The main one is called the “Gambler’s Fallacy”, which is the belief
that a streak (winning or losing) in a game of pure (or mostly pure) chance, will soon be
reversed, in order to achieve the long-run expected win/loss frequency.8
This fallacy is most clearly defined in terms of a sequence of fair coin flips, where the
gambler’s fallacy is:
If one observes a growing streak of Hs, the probability that the next flip will
be T increases after each successive H. That is, the longer the streak of Hs,
the higher is the probability that the next flip will be an T.
Restricted to just two consecutive flips, the gambler’s fallacy is that the probability
that an H will be followed by another H is lower than the probability that it will be
followed by a T. Thus, the gambler’s fallacy is similar to the belief in a “hot hand”, but
there an H is believed to be more likely, rather than less likely, after an H.
Both GVT and MS assert that the gambler’s fallacy is a commonly held belief. Of
course, this belief is a fallacy, since the probability that the next flip will be an H is
precisely one-half (in a fair coin), no matter what the past history is.
MS uses unweighted averages of HH-percentages, because Miller and Sanjurjo assert
that peoples’ beliefs about streaks in gambling are based on gamblers’ observations of
many short, but whole sequences of events, or complete games. These are the “units of
analysis” that best model how people incorrectly come to believe in the gambler’s fallacy.
In the analogy of coin flips, a finite sequence of flips (say, of length four) is the unit of
analysis, and multiple sequences are observed. Miller and Sanjurjo assert that people use
“natural” statistics, which equally weight what they observe in each sequence or game.
Hence, their beliefs are essentially based on an unweighted averaging of the sequences and
games they observe. And since unweighted averages of HH-percentages underestimate
the true probability that an H will follow an H,9 this intuitive (but incorrect) thinking
leads to a belief in the gambler’s fallacy. Miller and Sanjurjo write:
8In the “long run”, the frequency of wins should be about equal to the frequency of losses. That is
a consequence of the “law of large numbers”. The belief that we should also see this balance in small
sequences has been facetiously called the “law of small numbers”.
9The unweighted average is 40.5% for sequences of length four. For longer sequences, the unweighted
average HH-percentage remains less than 50%, although it approaches 50% as the sequence length in-
creases. For example, in length-six sequences, the unweighted average HH-percentage is 41.6%, averaged
over the 62 sequences that have an H in one of the first five positions.
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The implications for learning are stark: to the extent that decision makers
update their beliefs regarding sequential dependence10 with the (unweighted)
empirical probabilities that they observe in finite length sequences, they can
never unlearn a belief in the gambler’s fallacy. ...
no amount of exposure to these sequences can make a belief in the gamblers
fallacy go away.
And:
... in treating the sequence as the unit of analysis, the average empirical
probability across coins amounts to an unweighted average ... and thus leads
the data to appear consistent with the gambler’s fallacy.11
6 But What About Basketball?
We have seen why MS is concerned with unweighted averages of HH-percentages in
their treatment of the Gambler’s Fallacy. But what about streaks in basketball? MS
is concerned with unweighted averages there also, but the explanation for this is more
subtle than for the Gambler’s Fallacy. To get to that explanation, we first have to discuss
another way that Miller and Sanjurjo explain their main statistical observation.
6.1 Alice and Bob
In trying to explain the main technical issue in their paper, Miller (in an online post)
describes a competition between two players I will call Alice and Bob (I am modifying
the description of the game, but not altering its mathematical features).
The scenario is as follows: A computer has been programmed12 to simulate a fair coin
flip. It first generates a random sequence of four fair coin flips (printing out the sequence
for later verification, and Bob can’t see the output now); then, the computer randomly
picks a position of one of the Hs in the sequence, provided that it is in one of the first
three positions. If there is no such position, the computer starts again. If there is such
a position, Bob is invited to bet whether the following position in the sequence is an H
or a T. Note that the value (H or T) has already been generated and written down. If
10The term “sequential dependence” refers to the way that one event relates to a prior one. In the
case of two flips, it refers to whether an H or a T follows an H.
11The phrase ‘across coins’ should be interpreted as ‘across sequences’ in the treatment here, because
in MS it is assumed that each sequence is generated by a fair, but different coin.
12Both Alice and Bob have previously verified that the program is correct.
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Bob’s bet is correct, Alice pays him $1, and if it is incorrect, Bob pays Alice $1. Notice
that Alice has no active role except to pay out or collect the winnings. What should
Bob pick, H or T? One is tempted to answer “pick either one, because on any flip the
probability of an H is the same as the probability of a T.” But that answer ignores the
full context of the competition.
The answer is that Bob should pick T, not H. Randomly generating a sequence of
length four is equivalent to randomly picking one of the sixteen sequences shown in
Table 1, because the probability of generating any specific sequence is that same as
the probability of generating any other sequence (i.e., (1
2
)4). So, instead of imagining
the computer generating a random sequence of length four, imagine that the computer
randomly (with equal probability) picks one of the fourteen relevant sequences; and
then randomly picks an H in one of the first three positions of that sequence, at which
point Bob bets either that the following (already determined) flip is an H or is a T.
If we repeated this scenario many times, the frequency that the following character is
an H, would be a good estimate of the unweighted average of the HH-percentages, over
the fourteen relevant sequences. Since the unweighted average of the HH-percentages is
40.5%, the probability that Bob will win if he picks H is only 0.405. That is why Bob
should pick T.
The key point is that this scenario has two stages: the computer first picks a sequence
with equal probability; and second it randomly picks an H in the first three positions of
that sequence (if there is one). But that is very different from a one-stage scenario where
the computer randomly picks an H in one of the first three positions of the fourteen
relevant sequences. In this second scenario, the sequences would not be picked with
equal probability, because the distribution of Hs is not uniform. In the second scenario,
the probability that Bob wins if he picks H is exactly 0.5, not 0.405. The first scenario
corresponds to an unweighted averaging of the HH-percentage observed in each sequence,
and the second corresponds to a weighted average of the HH-percentages. Further, the
second scenario roughly reflects how GVT obtained the reference number it used to
compare a player’s HH-percentage, while the first one roughly reflects how MS does.13
13In this paper, we have only discussed HH-percentages because it is the only statistic discussed in
the NYT articles, and it is sufficient to illustrate the key difference in the approaches of GVT and MS.
But actually, the main statistic discussed in both GVT and MS is a bit more involved. Define the “TH-
percentage” in a sequence as the percentage of Ts that are followed by an H. Then define statistic D for
a sequence as its HH-percentage minus its TH-percentage. D relates the relative frequency that an H
follows an H to the relative frequency that it follows a T in a sequence, and it may be a more meaningful
statistic to use to answer questions about “hot hands”. Now, considering again all the sequences of
length four, we see that there are exactly the same number of HH pairs as TH pairs. However, the
unweighted average of the sixteen D values is not zero, but something less than zero. This is analogous
to the fact that the unweighted average HH-percentage is less than 50%, the percentage of all Hs in the
12
6.2 Is this relevant for basketball?
The answer depends on what specific question you are asking. For example, we could ask:
Did a specific player exhibit “streak shooting” in a specific game? or ask: Is a specific
player a “streak shooter” generally, considered over a season or their entire career?
6.2.1 Analysis for a single game
For the first question, let’s suppose that a player, who has a long-term 50% hit rate,
shoots four times in a game. We want to know if the player exhibited a hot hand,
and so we compute his HH-percentage for that game. We then compare that number
to a reference number derived from random sequences generated without an explicit hot
hand. We could compare his number to the HH-percentage generated from a long random
sequence, in which case the reference number should be 50%. This essentially (but not
exactly) reflects the approach in GVT. But another approach, which reflects a different
way to model a player without a hot hand, is to consider all the random sequences of
length four. If we use that model, then the number to compare with is 40.5%. The
reasoning, detailed next, is similar to the reason that Bob should bet on T rather than
H.
We model the player without a hot hand simply as a fair coin, i.e., each shot is a hit
(H) with probability of one-half, independent of any other shot; so in a game, the player
(with no hot hand) generates a random sequence of Hs and Ts. As discussed earlier,
we can also think of the generation of a random sequence of four flips as a random
selection (with equal probability) of one of the sixteen four-flip sequences. Thus, instead
of thinking of the player (who does not have a hot hand) generating a random sequence
of length four, we model the player’s record as a selection of one of the sixteen sequences,
chosen at random.14 So, we compare the player’s actual HH-percentage in the game to
the HH-percentages from the fourteen relevant random sequences. But which specific
number obtained from those HH-percentages should we use? The statistical approach
is to consider what we would see over time, if we randomly selected many sequences
of length four from the relevant fourteen. Each random sequence is selected with the
same probability, 1/14, and so if we select many random sequences of length four and
take the average of the HH-percentages we observe, what we will get is the sum of the
first three positions that are followed by another H. So, the issues that arise in using D values are well
illustrated by considering only the HH-percentages.
14But, since we are only interested in the hot-hand question, the only relevant sequences considered
in MS are the fourteen sequences that have an H in one of the first three positions. I would have chosen
to include the other two sequences as well, on the grounds that a player who makes none of his shots,
or only his last shot, should certainly not be said to have a ”hot hand”.
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fourteen HH-percentages, divided by 14, i.e., the unweighted average of the fourteen HH-
percentages. So, in this model of a player without a hot hand, we should compare the
real player’s HH-percentage to 40.5%.
This means that when the unit of analysis is an individual sequence, rather than an
individual flip, to determine if a player with a 50% hit rate exhibits streak shooting in
a single sequence (a game, say), we should not compare the observed HH-percentage to
50%, but rather to a number less than 50%.
Four is just for illustration Now, in most games, a player shoots more than four
times, and in fact, shoots a different number of times in each game. So the four-shot
example is just an illustration, a simple idealized scenario used to explain the point made
in MS: when the unit of analysis is a player’s record in a single game, or perhaps even
a single season, the value we compare to should be lower than the long-term hit rate of
that player. So, for example, if we observe that a player with a well-established hit-rate
of 50% has an HH-percentage of 50% in a game or season, that can be taken as evidence
that the player has exhibited a hot hand in that sequence, rather than evidence against
it. How strong that evidence is in favor of a hot hand requires additional probability
theory, and is affected by the length of the sequence. Length four sequences demonstrate
the effect dramatically, but over a season or career, the sequence might be long enough
that the effect is small. For a fair coin, the average HH-percentage, averaged over all
sequences of length k, approaches one-half as k increases, although it is always below
one-half.
6.2.2 Season or career-long analysis
For the second question, if a career is long enough and an individual player makes many
shots, it seems appropriate to compute an HH-percentage over all of the Hs, equally
weighting each basket, meaning that the unit of analysis is an individual H. This might
even be sensible for a single season, depending on the number of shots taken. That is
essentially the approach taken in GVT, where a player’s HH-percentage is compared to
his season-long hit rate. If they are close to each other, then GVT takes that as evidence
against a hot hand.
But according to MS, in a random sequence of coin flips with length equal to the
number of shots, call it K, that a player makes in a typical season, the unweighted
HH-percentage averaged over all the possible K-length sequences, is still significantly
less than 50%. Hence, MS assert that the proper unit of analysis is a player’s record
for an entire season, considered as one sequence. In that case, when determining if a
player (with a 50% hit rate) was generally a streak shooter, we should compare his HH-
14
percentage for the season to the unweighted average HH-percentage in all the possible
K-length sequences. Then, as in our discussion of a single game, an HH-percentage of
50% for the season should be taken as evidence that the player is a streak shooter.
6.3 It’s the model
When there is a dispute between academics, particularly in science or mathematics, it is
easier for a journalist to explain the dispute by saying that one of the parties made an
“error” or had a “misperception”. And, that explanation may be more attractive to the
public. But the reality is often that the parties have a legitimate difference of opinion on
some methodological or data issue. When using mathematics to study a natural or human
phenomenon, we must create a detailed model of the phenomenon to allow the application
of mathematics. Different models can lead to different ways that mathematics is used.
In the disagreement between the GVT and MS papers, the fundamental issue is not that
one of the parties made a mathematical error or had a misperception of randomness —
the underlying issue concerns the “unit of analysis” that the mathematics applies to,
and that is determined by the way one models a player without a hot hand. The unit
of analysis then dictates whether an unweighted or weighted average of HH-percentages
(over all random sequences of a fixed length) is used to determine the reference number
that a player’s HH-percentage will be compared to. The take-home lesson here is that
modeling is a critical and difficult part of the application of mathematics. It is not enough
to “get the math right”. To make the math meaningful, you have to create a meaningful
model, and people often disagree on which models are the most meaningful.
7 One Last Piece of Nonsense
In the caption of the table shown in Johnson’s article, after showing that the computed
average is 40.5 percent, Johnson adds:
This is not, however, a violation of the laws of randomness. A head is followed
by a head 12 times and by a tail 12 times. But by concentrating only on the
flips that follow heads and ignoring the other data, we are fooled by a selection
bias. (italics added)
What? The disagreement between the 40.5 percent average, and the fact that in the
table a head follows a head exactly the same number of times that a tail follows a head,
has nothing to do with “concentrating only on the flips that follow heads.” A “selection
bias” is discussed in MS, but it is the consequence of choosing one of the fourteen relevant
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sequences of length four, with equal probability, independent of how many Hs are in the
first three positions. As we have discussed above, since there are more sequences that
have at least one HT than have at least one HH, the selection bias leads to seeing a
T follow an H more often than an H following an H. It is nonsense to say that “by
concentrating only on the flips that follow heads and ignoring the other data, we are
fooled by a selection bias.”
8 Aristotle and Appelbaum
Appelbaum, after asserting that “On average, just 40.5 percent of the heads are followed
by another heads” continues with
Go ahead, see for yourself (link to the October 17 NYT article by George
Johnson).
That link leads to the Johnson NYT article, which contains the table showing that
precisely 50 percent of the heads are followed by another heads. So, although Appelbaum
encourages the reader to “see for yourself”, it seems that he did not make the effort.
Apparently, he was so convinced of the claim that he didn’t think it needed empirical
testing.
This reminds me of the story about Aristotle and the role of theoretical versus em-
pirical thinking. Aristotle asserted that men have more teeth than women. As Bertrand
Russell wrote: “Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have
fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth
open while he counted.”
So Appelbaum didn’t do the counting. Ironically, both the NYT articles discuss the
the psychology of perceived randomness, and how easy it is to be fooled, even in the face
of clear evidence. Johnson writes:
For all their care to be objective, scientists are as prone as anyone to valuing
data that supports their hypothesis over those that contradict it.
9 What about the New York Times, the Newspaper
of Record
How could the Johnson article, and even more the Appelbaum article, have been pub-
lished in the New York Times? They wrote nonsensical things about probability and
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seriously misunderstand MS. The Wall Street Journal also wrote about the hot hands
dispute in “The ‘hot hand’ debate gets flipped on its head”, by Ben Cohen, September
29, 2015, and initially made exactly the same mistake as the NYT articles. They wrote:
Toss a coin four times. Write down what happened. Repeat that process one
million times. What percentage of flips after heads also come up heads? The
obvious answer is 50%. That answer is also wrong. The real answer is 40%...
But then on September 30, in an online version of the article, the error is noted and
corrected to:
Toss a coin four times. Write down the percentage of heads on the flips
coming immediately after heads. Repeat that process one million times. On
average, what is that percentage?
...
Corrections & Amplifications:
A previous version of this article incorrectly describes the question regarding
coin flips. The question is about the average percentage of flips, not the
overall percentage of flips. (Sept. 30)
But the NYT did not make any correction of the mistakes in the Johnson article.
More embarrassingly, since several of the readers of the Johnson article correctly pointed
out the nonsense, how did the Appelbaum article make it past the editors? As one of
the readers (Larry from St. Louis) commented online after the Appelbaum article:
It is shocking that such a basic error would get through both the Sunday
Review and the Upshot. Is no one on the paper paying attention to what
people write? Further, if the author of this Upshot column read the comments
on the Sunday Review article, then he would have figured out the error for
himself.
Apparently neither Appelbaum nor the editors read the comments of the readers, or
if they did, they didn’t understand them, or think to ask an expert. And now, almost two
months after the publication of the Johnson and Appelbaum articles, and in contrast to
the WSJ, there is no retraction, or further clarification in the Times, or even the printing
of a letter to the editor. As an educator in a field involving mathematical reasoning, and
one concerned with the public’s understanding of quantitative issues, and a long-time
NYT subscriber15, this is all very disturbing.
15and not a WSJ reader
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The 16 Number of Hs in the Number HH-Percentage
sequences first three positions of HHs
HHHH 3 3 100
HHHT 3 2 66.66 ...
HHTH 2 1 50
HHTT 2 1 50
HTHH 2 1 50
HTHT 2 0 0
HTTH 1 0 0
HTTT 1 0 0
THHH 2 2 100
THHT 2 1 50
THTH 1 0 0
THTT 1 0 0
TTHH 1 1 100
TTHT 1 0 0
TTTH 0 0 0
TTTT 0 0 0
Total 24 12
Average from 40.5
the first 14
sequences
Table 1: The sixteen HT sequences of length four. The first fourteen contain an H in
the first three positions. In each of those fourteen sequences, the number of Hs in the
first three positions is shown; next the number of those Hs that are followed by another
H is shown; then the percentage of Hs in the first three positions that are followed by
another H is shown. This is the HH-percentage. The total number of Hs in the first
three positions is 24, and the number of Hs in the first three positions that are followed
by another H is 12, exactly 50%. However, the unweighted average of the percentages is
not 50%, it is about 40.5%. True, but so what?
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